Abstract. In 1968 the authors of the so-called Harvard Report, proposed the recognition of an irreversible coma as a new criterion for death. The proposal was accepted by the medical, legal, religious and political circles in spite of the lack of any explanation why the irreversible coma combined with the absence of brainstem reflexes, including the respiratory reflex might be equated to death.
Introduction
The problem of the relationship between the soul and the body is as old as philosophy itself. Plato and Aristotle are the authors, who have discussed that problem and greatly influenced the Western thought as regards human nature. Their opinions were opposite and so remained in the thinking of contemporary authors. Shortly speaking, for Plato the soul was the human whereas for Aristotle with his hylomorphic theory, to be human signified to be body and soul. For Plato, the soul had innate knowledge, for Aristotle all what we know must be first apprehended by our senses. I would like to analyze their views concerning philosophical anthropology in the context of the contemporary medicine. However, medicine is connected with an other important name in philosophy, which is Rene Descartes. In the Cartesian thought, the person is a composite of soul and body, an artifact rather than
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an organic whole. The person is the working mind, the process of thinking.
Thus, we may conclude, that the anthropological vision of Descartes is
Platonic but redefined in the way, in which human being is understood as consciousness rather that the soul. Later, the concept of the soul was eliminated from philosophy and natural sciences and what was left is consciousness interpreted as the mind and even as the human.
In my paper, I would like to show, that the Cartesian reduction of the human to subjective consciousness, which is wrong from the point of view of the Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophical tradition and which cannot be reconciled with the teaching of the Catholic Church as regards the relationship between the body and the soul, heavily influenced the discussion concerning medical, moral and legal status of the patients with the disturbances of consciousness. There is a strong tendency to define these patients as "non-persons" only based on the presumed lack of the evidence of their consciousness. Such a practice creates great moral problems especially as regards the patients diagnosed brain dead (BD), brainstem dead (BSD) in order to become the donors of organs.
The Cartesian/Lockean tradition and the brain/based criteria for death
Contemporary medicine is not philosophically neutral. There is a subtle but important connection between medical world and the philosophical conceptual framework in which it functions. This conceptual framework in Europe is marked by several philosophical currents, that are globally called modern philosophy. Although history of medicine is as long as the history of humanity, medicine of our times is heavily influenced by thought of some philosophers, among whom I would like to point out two of them,
i.e. Descartes and Locke, whose thought seems to be the most important.
Descartes, being a philosopher and a mathematician, was also interested in medicine and the investigation concerning human nature. For Descartes, the human person is reduced to his mind, a res cogitans (a thinking thing).
The body is merely a res extensa, something which has geometric extension
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and can be viewed as a kind of machine or animal attached to the mind.
The mind, which Descartes identified with consciousness, and the body, are two separate substances. 1 The connection between the mind and body takes place somewhere in the brain; probably its locus is the pineal gland. 2 Descartes returned to the Platonic tradition of innate knowledge. 3 The body is not the source of the ideas, it is outside of the mind, and therefore outside of the person. Thus, we can say, that "Descartes exposed the Platonic dualism between body and soul, matter and spirit which had so long troubled Christian theology" to the level that may be called the reductio ad absurdum." 4 However, in our times such a philosophical anthropology has become very popular not only among philosophers but also among physicians and common people. The popular thinking is that the soul is located somewhere in the brain, 5 therefore human being is also basically the brain as the only generator of human thoughts.
The English-speaking world has been more influenced by Locke than by
Descartes. Being pragmatic, Locke did not concern himself with the nature of consciousness, but rather with the conscious person as the starting point of his discussion. In Locke's doctrine, the critical constitutive element that defines a person's personhood is the continuity of his psychological life 1 R. Descartes. De Libero Arbitrio III, 7. He says: "I may doubt, but doubt is thought and if I think I must also exist." For Aristotle the certitude of my existence in a real world is founded on my sense of touch and can always be verified by it. I feel my body and with my body I keep in contact with my world. But for Plato, Augustine, and Descartes rational thought must be its own guarantee of its own contact with reality; it cannot receive the certitude from anything outside its own self-evidence. When we apply this kind of reasoning to people in BD/BSD, the consequences are obvious. Even the very idea of treating the human body as a machine, an artefact being a collection of parts, which can be mutually interchanged, is purely Cartesian. Moreover, such is, in fact, contemporary medicine as a whole with its mechanistic vision of the human body and the reduction of the phenomenon of life to chemical processes. Quantum physics, however, with its theories of non-locality and entanglement and the field theories can be viewed as the return to the Aristotelian idea of vis vitalis or entelechia in a modern and interesting form.
(which encompasses such things as memories, plans and behaviors, among others). Therefore, the loss of psychological life, which necessarily means the loss of consciousness, indicates that the person no longer exists, even though his body (devoid of psychological attributes) still demonstrates the physiological signs of life.
6
Such views are quite popular even though they are self-contradictory.
Both identify the person with the conscious mind or consciousness. Such a construct does not work, not even on a theoretical level, because human mind cannot function as a disembodied spirit. We cannot identify a disembodied consciousness; moreover, to discover our own existence we need first to discover the existence of our bodies. JAMA, 1968, 205 (6), ss. 337-340 (85-88) at 337 (85). successful gestation of a fetus in a BD woman…; sexual maturation of a BD child…: cases "BES" and "Baby A" -evidently, these children had some residual hypothalamic function…; proportional growth of a BD child…: cases "Baby A," "Baby Z" and "TK").
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Nevertheless, the argument that the diagnosis of BD or BSD is the consequence of the biological death of the patient was accepted by most participants in the discussion concerning the neurological criteria for death both in the American "whole brain death" and in the British "brainstem death" 13 versions. 
The Various Rationales for the Brain Based Criteria for Death
Currently, there are several ways of construing the rationale for the neurological criteria for death. According to these rationales death, the term "death" refers to the reality which is 
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There is no consensus which rationale should be accepted; all of them, except the sociological one, are easily refutable from the medical point of view. The remaining sociological one (3) is hardly acceptable because of its clearly utilitarian and relativistic character. It simply says, that society may define as "dead" any group of citizens on the basis of the criteria that it has freely chosen.
The empirical reality of BD/BSD. The State of the Brains of the BD/BSD Patients
According to the official rationales on "brain death", the brains of BD patients are irreversibly destroyed or not functioning. The empirical evidence, however, has consistently contradicted this claim. The brains of BD and BSD patients are able to produce hormones which are critical for the functioning of the whole body. 19 Moreover, discussions concerning the Minnesota and the
British criteria for "brainstem death" revealed an 8% likelihood that patients declared "dead" would have detectable electrical activity. This, according to Weaver would be the proof of a living and functioning cerebral cortex 20 .
Kerridge maintains that this number can be up to 40%. In contrast, arguing appears frequently that this does not mean necessarily the functioning of the cerebral cortex at the level indispensable for maintaining the vital activity; alternatively, this electrical activity may be attributed to some sub-cortical structures. Anyhow, the brain electrical activity reported in some BD patients may suggest presence of some level of consciousness.
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Many authors stress the possibility of existence of consciousness in BD/BSD patients. 22 It is important to know that it is the thalamus and other parts of the limbic system which are responsible for the subjective sensation of pain; the cortex's role in pain perception is merely modulatory, hence Neurology, 1993, 240: 243-246 . for if you treat the body in a way, which is almost the same as the body of a living patient, can you be sure that it is a dead body? Intensivists know that healthy infants have been delivered from "brain-dead" mothers, and that some "brain dead" patients retain normal bodily functions except those connected with conscious actions. They also know that there is some brain activity preserved, including the production of hormones in the hypothalamus. Therefore, for most of the physicians engaged in organ procurement, although the patient is not biologically dead, he/she "has entered into a second irreversible state, in that the 'person' and/or 'spirit' is no longer present in the body." 37 According to these physicians, such patients dwell in "a hybrid status -that of the dead-person-in-a-living-body." 38 Hence, the physicians usually keep saying to the families, that the " 'person' is no 34 The most popular way of thinking among them is that "the patient as a person is dead" but his/her body is alive. These physicians apply a personal/psychological rationale of "brain death" instead of the official, biological one, for they, as specialists, could not deny that bodies of BD/BSD patients react for the treatment in the same way as the bodies of other patients. 35 The difference between Dunlap and Fritze was that Fritze was no yet declared "neurologically dead". Mohney writes, "When his family came in to say their final farewell, the doctors discussed organ donation with them, even though Mr Fritze had yet to be declared officially brain dead, something he believes violated official guidelines. If a more experienced doctor had not returned from holiday three days after his accident, he is in little doubt that he would not be here today. "I think I would have been stuck in bed until my body didn't work any more, so they could take the parts from me," Mr Fritze said. As it happened, when the new doctor took another look at the x-ray, she immediately realised that there was a good chance that Mr Fritze might recover. Within days, he was able to communicate by nodding his head. After nearly two years, and constant rehabilitation therapy, Mr Fritze can now speak and move, although he remains confined to a wheelchair and reliant on an assistant". 53 
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Boseley says that in the UK
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When she asked for reasons, their responses were unconvincing, stating that they "didn't feel quite right about donation or, alternatively, that they supposed they should get it sorted out [emphasis added]." 67 Troug, who is a professor of Harvard medical school suggest, that "brain death" as a concept is false and unnecessary for it is reducing the number of organs available for transplantation. According to him, the only sincere option is to admit openly, that the donors are alive, but in such a state that, provided their free acceptance of donation, no real harm is done to them, even if they are killed during the excision of organs. 7. The Thomistic Refutation of "Brain Death" and "Brainstem Death"
As previously noted, the neurological criteria for death could be derived from the dualistic "Cartesian" thinking about human nature, which leads to seeing the brain as the "mind-incarnating tissue"
69
, for as previously noted, in the Cartesian paradigm, man is perceived as a bodiless thinking subject.
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As we discus further this should find refutation in Thomistic thinking. to be so), immediately the question arises about the status of such a subject. This is the reason why the humanness and personhood of the people in vegetative state, anencephalic children and people in a deep coma is questioned. In public discussions, the loss of consciousness has become one of the most common arguments.
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vinists. 71 For them human being (the patient) "is" the brain; the body is only "attached" to that organ. The brain is the only part of the body, where the mind can dwell, the only "mind incarnating tissue." 72 Consciousness, and not the somatic integration and the bodily life, is regarded by the proponents of this view as the central sign of life. For them a chronically unconscious patient is dead. Moreover, these physicians typically ignore the literature demonstrating that the some of the patients diagnosed as "vegetative"
were in fact conscious, and so are some patients in coma, including those suspected as being "brain/brainstem dead". One has to stress however, that an elevated number of wrong diagnosis (40%) in 90'ties is now somewhat reduced, thanks to the introduction of 'the minimal conscious state' term and new sophisticated techniques; erroneous diagnosis regard mainly patients within 6-12 months after the traumatic event, and in case of a longer vegetative state the diagnosis hardly (but not impossibly) can be erroneous.
Although it is not the case in most deeply comatose/apneic patients, let us assume a situation, in which a patient really lost his consciousness permanently. A legitimate question then arises; Who or what is she?
Is she a human being, is she a person? According to the Cartesian and Lockean tradition, we would have to admit, that such a patient lost his/ her personhood or even human nature because of the irreversible loss of consciousness. Some would say therefore, that he/she is no longer a human but only a "humanoid", non-personal being or "biological artifact", a living but "empty" human body. 73 According to Harris,
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Once a new human individual comes into existence she will gradually move from being a potential or a pre-person into an actual person when she becomes 
all living human beings possess a radical capacity for rationality because they share a human nature, and it is part of the nature of human beings to develop and actualize rational powers. This is true even if the power has not yet developed or is blocked by disease or injury. Hence, the presence of integrated bodily life in a being that possesses a human nature is both necessary and sufficient to ascribe to that entity a radical capacity for rationality.
81 Seifert and Persson, 82 hold that human beings are, biologically speaking, animals; our death is necessarily the death of our biological organism.
Death is, according to the Aristotelian and Thomistic view, the passing away of one substance (the living animal) and coming to be of another (or an aggregation of them) -the corpse, which is, ontologically speaking, a compositions of structures being in the process of decay because of the inability to resist entropy (whereas a living body is a natural whole, effectively resisting entropy). Therefore, the question of life and death of an individual human being must be related not to the "brain life" or "brain death" but to the existence of the whole being, i.e. of the living human organism as an integrated whole. We cannot say that human life is identical to the life of the brain for every human being is numerically the same before and after the development of his/her brain.
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The modern medical/scientific community often has difficulty in understanding the Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophical notion of substance.
Its modern equivalent, the notion of "the living organism as an integrated whole" is less abstract and thus more easily graspable. This modern version of the notion of substance conveying the understanding of a living body constitutes a different kind of unity than, say a corpse or a machine. This implies that we not only have our bodies, but we also are bodies, precisely living bodies.
Aquinas' discussion on human nature is both concise and insightful. He expressed it in his famous formula, that "the soul is the form of the body."
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According to him, it signifies, that the intellectual factor in us (mind or soul)
is united with the body as its unique perfecting, substantial form, 85 which is responsible both for conscious acts and for biological life. The Catholic Church adopted Thomas's holistic vision about human nature; it became part of the dogmatic teaching. The Council of Vienne in 1311 used the formula that the rational soul is per se "the form of the body." 86 , and so was the formula used in the Fifth Lateran Council (par. 336, 345). 87 Therefore, one may say that Catholic Church adopted the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas concerning the ontological structure of the human being as a unity of the soul and the body, "a single nature with rational, sensitive and vegetative powers." St. Thomas stresses that the intellectual soul is responsible not only for the intellectual functions but also for vegetative and sensitive ones. He writes, "And as life appears through various operations in different degrees of living things, that whereby we primarily perform each of all these vital actions is the soul. For the soul is the primary principle of our nourishment, sensation, and local movement; and likewise of our understanding." 89 Summa Theologiae, Ia, Q 76, Art.6. 90 Ibidem.
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91 He answers that it would be incorrect to say that the soul acts on the body via the brain, precisely because "the soul is united to the body as its form". Therefore, "it is impossible for it to be united by means of another body", and there is not "any other cause of union except the agent, which causes matter to be in act."
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Moreover, according to St. Thomas the whole soul is in every part of the body therefore, "on the withdrawal of the soul, no part of the body retains its proper action" 93 It indicates that if any part of the body retains its proper action, then the soul must be present in it. 94 According to Aquinas, the relation of the soul to the whole is not the same as its relation to the parts. He says [T] he whole soul is in each part of the body, by totality of perfection and of essence, but not by totality of power. For it is not in each part of the body, with regard to each of its powers; but with regard to sight, it is in the eye; and with regard to hearing, it is in the ear; and so forth. It has been demonstrated that the bodies of BD/BSD patients still continue countless organized and coordinated, teleological functions, therefore the human soul must be present in these patients. 95 Summa Theologiae, Ia, Q 76, Art.8.
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Aristotelian teaching about four causes, according to which the brain as any other part of the body can be neither "a material, nor an efficient, nor a final cause of a whole organism. These roles are fulfilled respectively by prime matter, by extrinsic agents (the mother and father, via the sperm and egg), or by the good of the individual respectively" 96 (the good being also the end for this individual). Material parts can play in the organism a role of efficient cause only by interaction (action and passion). Therefore, causality upon the whole cannot be attributed preferentially to any particular, material part of the body. 97 The point here is that the causality of material parts into an integrated whole is instrumental and shared reciprocally by all the elements in the body.
Moreover, if we hold that the brain is the central integrator of the body, the question is how the central integrator itself remains integrated. Since integration requires an integrator, the brain is no exception to this rule. It cannot be its own cause of integration because an external agent is necessary for efficient causality; it would require an integrator of a higher level. However, the latter would in turn require another integrator higher than itself, and so on ad infinitum. Thus, the theory of the brain as the central integrator Aristotle, Gen. et Corr., I.6, 322b, . 
Critique of the scientized Cartesianism in the discussion concerning BD and BSD
Shewmon adds that there is structural similarity between Descartes' mindbody dualism and the 'brain-body' dualism, which is currently present in the BD/BSD related literature. The only, though important, difference is that for Descartes the dualism existed between "a purely spiritual mind and a purely mechanical body", whereas "the neo-Cartesian dualism is purely materialistic, with the brain operating on 'mechanical' principles just as much as the rest of the body". 100 The other difference is tied with the
new status of the brain, which as a generator of consciousness, "becomes" a person. Therefore, in the scheme of Descartes, "the 'body' includes the brain" for it is a material organ "whereas for the type of neo-Cartesianism under discussion, 'body' includes everything except the brain."
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Despite their differences, both the Cartesian and the neo-Cartesian approaches hold that the human being consists of "two distinct entities in a hierarchical relationship, with the mental entity governing the mechanics of the non-mental entity."
102 Both positions are reductionist, even though these reductionisms, when compared, are working in the opposite directions.
The problem with Descartes was that he was not able to recognize the human mental functions as "a spiritual-physical hybrid, neither reducible to nor separable from bodily (brain) functions." 103 Therefore, for him, the human being was the immaterial mind. Neo-Cartesians make an analogical mistake within their materialistic scheme. They reduce the human being to the brain, because, as they think, only the brain is generating consciousness. 104 All that Cartesianism and neo-Cartesianism have achieved is an intellectual chaos and confusion, the result of their splitting and reifying "what are in reality two inextricable components of a single hybrid entity," 105 which is the human being.
In opposition to the Cartesian and Lockean thinking, we have, therefore, to say that our consciousness is a function both of our mind and of the body.
Consciousness develops gradually from early childhood onward through the process of reflecting over the constant interaction of our body with other bodies constituting the outside world. This interaction is a complicated process, which is especially visible in patients coming back from prolonged coma or minimally conscious state to normal life. In every moment of our active life, we keep identifying ourselves as bodies among other bodies and also as active agents moving ourselves and acting upon other things.
Thus, consciousness is not the same thing as the soul, even though the soul is the necessary condition for consciousness. The soul is present and functioning from the very beginning of our existence, well before we start to think. In other words, human consciousness cannot develop independently from the body; it can only do so in a living organism, a living body animated by the soul. A healthy human being is capable of developing consciousness because it is part of his natural capacity. The developing of this natural capacity requires a material support, namely the maturation of the nervous system, especially during the early years of infancy when we first come into contact with the external world. Thus, to mature, every newborn child has to actualize its capacity for the formation of consciousness. A similar process is observed after a major brain injury: the patients have to recapitulate this process of maturation of the nervous system in order to regain their ability to contact with the outside world and to reconstruct their consciousness and their personality.
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Conclusions
There are physicians who stress that we should publicly admit that organ donors die on the operating table during the organ excision and that they may be aware of that situation and feel the pain. However, these appeals do not reach the public and the whole society does not know the detailed facts regarding the situation of organ donors.
Catholic theologians, ethicists and physicians took part in the discussion concerning the problem of the neurological criteria for death. In such a discussion one might expect a lot of authors who would use the traditional 
nature, which is incompatible with the teaching of the Catholic Church about human nature. There are abundant expressions like "the body is alive but it is not human life" or "the body is alive but the person is dead" that are almost a standard in the literature concerning BD/BSD cases.
Thus, according to the teaching of the Catholic Church, human beings have a singular nature, the form of which is the "rational or intellectual" soul. So is this issue expressed in the Catechism of the Catholic Church, which states,
The unity of soul and body is so profound that one has to consider the soul to be the "form" of the body: i.e., it is because of its spiritual soul that the body made of matter becomes a living, human body; spirit and matter, in man, are not two natures united, but rather their union forms a single nature.
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The human body (human organism) exists thanks to this integrative power of the soul. Therefore, every living human being is animated by the human soul as its substantial form as long as it is alive. Reasoning in line with the teaching of the Catholic Church, in each and every case, when we encounter any member of our species who is biologically alive, such as for example a BD or BSD patient, we encounter an animated, living human being and the bearer of human dignity and human rights, that is, we encounter a human person. Therefore, our moral obligations regarding such a person are the same as for all other human persons.
Most of Catholic theologians, however, accepted the neurological criteria for death. Some of them worked with Vatican institutions and spoke in favor of the new approach to the problem of death. 108 These documents discussing Pope first stipulated three conditions for his tentative approval: (1) the ethical condition -"vital organs which occur singly in the body can be re- The Pope clearly understood the dynamic, evolving nature of scientific inquiry, and he by no means intended his address to the Transplantation Society as a veto on all further philosophical debate or scientific investigation regarding the physiological basis of somatic integration. 117 After the conference, the aforementioned group of participants published an article strongly opposing the veracity of the neurological criteria for death;
118 later on, they published also a book Finis Vitae -Is "Brain Death"
True Death?, 119 in which they presented their opinions in a comprehensive way and rejected the organismic unity paradigm of BD/BSD as untenable.
Also, the stand of Benedict XVI concerning the problem of the neurological criteria for death was very cautious. He stated that vital organs may be extracted only ex cadavere 120 and that the debate concerning the new criteria for death should continue.
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In order to summarize the article, I would like to stress three important clues:
1) According to hylomorphic philosophical anthropology represented by St. Thomas Aquinas (and the teaching of the Catholic Church), the loss of consciousness, even complete and irreversible, cannot signify neither the death of the human being nor the loss of personhood.
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2) The contemporary state of knowledge in medicine allows to say that the patients diagnosed as BD or BSD, are somatically alive; moreover, some of them can recover to almost or fully normal life. In many cases the BD or BSD patients may possess some level of consciousness, and, at least in some recorded cases, were able to understand human speech.
3) In view of combining different aspects, current neurological criteria for human death both in the version of whole brain death (BD) and brainstem death (BSD) have no joint and univocal medical, philosophical, theological and moral justification. An interdisciplinary discussion should still hold open.
